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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 This project highlights the nature of Enlightenment reform in 18
th
-century 
Germany, particularly in the Kingdom of Prussia and the Electorate of Bavaria under 
Frederick II and Maximilian III Joseph. Both of these rulers launch similar reforms under 
the guise of enlightened absolutism and enlightenment rhetoric with very different 
results, each catering to the specific needs of their respective principalities. Reform is 
offered along the lines of compulsory education, codification, humanitarian legal reform, 
and religious toleration, all in the spirit of the Enlightenment. However, when the extent 
and details of these reforms are examined, it can be demonstrated that the fail to put forth 
a progressive definition of rights in their respective states, instead serving to solidify state 
authority and further the absolutist control of the monarch through careful alienation and 
control over the nobility, clergy, and the lowest classes. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The Enlightenment is characterized in popular history by a focus on reason and a 
coherent break from the more superstitious beliefs that mired the preceding centuries. 
During this age, the intellectual philosophe served as the high mark of popular culture, 
with men such as Voltaire, Hume, and Diderot publishing broadly acclaimed literature 
that shaped both social and political discussion throughout eighteenth-century Europe. 
Often a bold and convenient line is drawn through the varying ideals professed by 
Enlightenment thinkers, stretching from the political rhetoric of the American and French 
Revolutions to the modern conception of human rights and egalitarianism.  
 This line tends to ignore the political, social, and cultural context of the era, 
especially in regards to those themes that do not fit into a compartmentalized and 
progressive conception of history. It is where these lines between rhetoric and reality 
cross and blur that provide for stimulating insight into the realities of the eighteenth-
century and the ideals professed by the Enlightenment. Such a muddled intersection can 
be observed in the legal fiction of enlightened absolutism, two terms that many today 
would hold to be mutually exclusive: the upholding of rights through the investment of 
sole power in the state. This paradoxical theme flourished in varying degrees among the 
competing states of the Holy Roman Empire, facilitated by the marked dogmatic, 
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hierarchical, and confessional diversity that thrived in the Germanies during the 
Enlightenment.  
 The research presented here will examine the realization of rights-reform under 
enlightened absolutism in two German states that exhibit the heterogeneity of the 
Germanies during the era: that of the Protestant and politically eminent Kingdom of 
Prussia under Frederick II von Hohenzollern, and the less dominant Catholic Duchy of 
Bavaria under Maximilian III Joseph von Wittelsbach. An examination of the nature of 
reform in these two states, it can be shown that the various reform programs launched by 
both rulers supposedly informed by Enlightenment ideology in truth offered little break 
from the existing status quo at the time of their ascension. Instead these reforms served a 
pragmatic as opposed to a progressive function that sought to enhance state stability 
based on the political, social, and religious realities within the state. Despite the manner 
in which many histories remember Enlightenment reform within the Germanies, the 
manner, scope, and potency of reform existed in direct correlation to those policies which 
served to alienate the power of any institutional opposition to that of the monarchy. 
Rulers were able to thereby solidify absolutist control within the state under the guise of 
progressive and popular Enlightenment ideals while offering no progress within the realm 
of rights reform.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
RIGHTS THEORY AND THE LEGAL FICTION OF ENLIGHTENED ABSOLUTISM 
 
 
 In order to discuss the varying degree of enlightenment reform under Frederick II 
and Maximilian III, it is important to understand how rights were conceptualized during 
the eighteenth-century. The conception of rights in the twenty-first century is the result of 
over three-hundred years of fluctuating breaks from and reattachments to the status quo, a 
shifting trend of reform and reaction that cannot be traced in a linear, upward march. 
Much of the foundation of rights theory emerging during the Enlightenment broke from 
the perceived dogmatic superstition or reliance on classical authority that seemed to 
characterize the preceding era. The explosion of a reading culture among popular circles 
allowed for the emergence of an early definition of rights, and the academic and literary 
atmosphere helped formulate and develop this concept among the elite philosophical 
societies of the era.  
 It is difficult to pinpoint from where this notion of individual “rights” arose, 
certainly a number of trends within European popular culture of the era offer empirical 
links to the formation of this theory. One such trend is the rise of a reading culture that 
encompassed more than just the upper tiers of society; this trend pervaded all levels of 
society, yet not all individuals. Reading became integral to society in both the public and 
private sphere. Enlightenment Germany was no exception to this trend, as Historian Jane 
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Currran argues, “reading, the principal tool Enlightenment, first became a private matter, 
but there are many indications of reading as a persistent, regular social activity continuing 
throughout the period.”1 The growth of reading societies and the increasing popularity of 
the novel drastically changed the manner in which people viewed the concept of 
personhood, as it subconsciously catered empathy within the reader for the human 
situation. Novels such as Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747-48) or 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie, or the New Héloïse (1761) invoked a heavy conception of 
emotion and empathy, forcing the reader to envision themselves as the character through 
emotional involvement. Lynn Hunt argues that people became “fundamentally similar 
because of their inner feelings, [creating] a sense of equality and empathy through 
passionate involvement in the narrative.”2 This invocation of both emotion and empathy 
saw a drastic change in how the individual person grounded themselves in relation to 
society as a whole.  
 Hunt also argues that the rise in popularity of the portrait helped cultivate the 
sense of the individual within European culture, and had similar psychological and social 
ramifications among the population. The increasing demand for portraits began with a 
focus on “representations of types or on allegories of virtues or wealth,” but clients at the 
later-half of the century desired “more natural-looking renderings of psychological or 
physiognomical individuality,” the proliferation of which helped instill the concept of 
what historian Lynn Hunt states as the “single, separate, distinctive, and original” 
                                                          
1
 Jane V. Curran, “Oral Reading, Print Culture, and the German Enlightenment,” Modern Language Review 
100:3 (2005): 695-708. 
2
 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007): 35-69. 
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individual.
3
 There were other threads pervading Enlightenment culture that affirmed this 
sense of the “self-contained person”: a continued decline in the practice of public 
defecation, urination, or spitting, a shifting conception of the manner in which the 
individual experienced music and theater, and, above all, a growing focus on reason, 
sensibility, and the inner-human.
4
 All of these diverse themes served to alter the 
perception of individual personhood, and thus the manner in which people viewed 
themselves and their interactions with others. It was this emergence of the self-contained 
person that allowed people to detach from the self and invoke the empathetic element, 
enabling a heightened sense of both feeling and understanding between individuals that 
had clear implications on European society as whole. 
 This shifting perception of individual personhood not only changed the manner in 
which humans viewed themselves in relation to one another, but more importantly, it 
changed the manner in which the individual conceptualized their relationship to society 
and the institution that governed it. The blind authority and rigidity of dynastic 
absolutism was questioned intensely during the Enlightenment, with social contract 
theory and natural law providing a foundation for government that went further than the 
will of the sovereign; in essence, the legal fiction had to shift to accommodate these new 
theories lest the compact between society and the government be shattered.  
 The legal fiction of the era was altered to accommodate this shifting trend towards 
empathy and reason, and from this we see the emergence of enlightened absolutism 
among many of the great powers during the eighteenth-century. Dynastic absolutism 
                                                          
3
 Hunt, 70-112. 
4
 Hunt, 82-83. 
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conceived statehood in the body of the ruler and the ruler alone, with very little 
consideration to the individual geographical and cultural norms that were slowly rising 
towards the surface of popular consciousness. Absolue monarchy and enlightenment 
culture were not mutually exclusive, particularly in the German states. While the political 
models and policies in France proved less congruent with more radical popular 
Enlightenment culture, the unique political and confessional compositon of the 
Germanies allowed for a very unique and distinct expression of the growing trends of the 
Enlightenment in Europe. Historian H.M. Scott best explains the distinct nature of the 
German Aufklärung:  
Germany’s Aufklärer, publicists, and government officials generally concurred 
in advocating only limited, evolutionary change without seriously disrupting the 
status quo. Instead, Enlightenment ideas that operated as a destructive voice 
west of the Rhine were readily integrated into the established matrix of ideas, 
values and institutions.
5
  
In Germany, limited enlightenment, or perhaps “benevolent reform” integrated well into 
the existing social structures among the disparate states, and thus helped couch the more 
radical effects of revolution that wracked France towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, and also allowed for the flourishing of a unique legal fiction well-suited to 
accommodate the Enlightenment Zeitgeist. 
What emerged in the place of radical reform was the more conservative and 
digestible notion of the philosopher-prince: the benevolent ruler, the servant of the state, 
the avid intellectual, the accomplished musician, and overall, a woman or man of the 
                                                          
5
 H.M. Scott, Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe¸ (Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990): 221-244. 
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Enlightenment. Even the philosophes believed that all the identities of the monarch, 
however, were wrapped in absolute authority. Voltaire argued in his 1750 Voice of the 
Sage and the People, that “government cannot be good, if it does not have sole power.”6 
Enlightenment philosophers largely affirmed this conception of the philosopher-prince as 
the most effective means of promoting the emerging theories of the era, and the 
Germanies served the perfect breeding ground for this strange paradox of both 
enlightened principle and absolute authority. Dr. Charles Ingrao has argued that:  
The acceptance of absolutism was common to virtually all German political 
theorists; once a monarch had accepted the limits and responsibilities of natural 
law, all of the most prominent Aufklӓrer- from Pufendorf and Leibniz through 
Thomasius and Wolff to the young Kant- recognized the primacy of the central 
authority without allowing for any significant checks.
7
 
In clear contrast to many of the popular and slightly more egalitarian theories that would 
pervade France and Great Britain at the close of the era, enlightened absolutism emerged 
as a well-vetted facet of the German Enlightenment, and was even lauded by many titans 
of the Enlightenment from Western Europe, none so more than Voltaire. 
 However, there were clear trends that separated the legal fiction of enlightened 
absolutism from that of dynastic absolutism. The enlightened absolutist was named the 
first servant of the state, with the forefront of “the sovereign’s policy placed at the service 
of his or her subjects’ well-being, and was no longer directed one-sidedly towards the 
                                                          
6
 Roger Wines, Enlightened Despotism: Reform or Reaction, (Topeka, KA: D.C. Heath & Company, 
1967): 18. 
7
 Charles Ingrao, “The Problem of ‘Enlightened Absolutism’ and the German States,” The Journal of 
Modern History 58(1986): S166.  
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interests and reputation of the sovereign and the dynasty.”8 In addition, Lesaffer argues 
that the enlightened absolutist was held captive to a higher power, not necessarily that of 
God or the church, but instead to the shackles of reason and natural law. A strong aspect 
of a ruler’s legitimacy was derived from his conception as a servant to the state and a 
servant to reason, and as such, monarchical government played a heavy role in cultivating 
the arts, trade and industry, academics and schooling, and instituting religious toleration. 
Despite the supposedly benevolent and “enlightened” nature of many of these reforms, 
they served a more coherent means in promoting the welfare and taxability of the state 
and its citizenry, alienating the power of the nobility and clergy from interference in 
government action, and the consolidation and methodization of state administration to 
allow for streamlined military, social, and economic mobilization in times of crisis and 
war.  
The careful integration of Enlightenment thought and political necessity within 
eighteenth-century Germany allowed for the flourishing of enlightened absolutism as the 
most prominent legal fiction of the era. However, to what degree were increasingly 
popular notions of rights actualized under the rhetoric of enlightened absolutism and the 
philosopher-prince in Prussia under Frederick II and Bavaria under Maximilian III 
Joseph? History hails the Enlightenment for its focus on reason and skepticism as 
opposed to the supposed dogmatic superstition of the past, and it is as both an instrument 
and facilitator of reason that the theory of the philosopher-prince is founded. Flowing 
from this intellectual cornerstone were various state reforms, most notably the active 
                                                          
8
 Randall Lesaffer, European Legal History: A Cultural and Political Perspective, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009: 399. 
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cultivation of Enlightenment thought through centralized state effort, the establishment of 
accessible and state-mandated education, the institution of comprehensive legal reform 
programmes through codification, and the extension of religious toleration to 
confessional minorities within the state. It is these four criteria that serve as the best 
manner of measuring the true nature of reform within the state, determining to degree the 
reality of enlightenment reform meets with the popular intellectual trends of the era 
handed down by Frederick II and Maximilian III Joseph.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
STATE-SPONSORED INTELLECTUAL CULTIVATION IN PRUSSIA AND 
BAVARIA 
 
 
Compulsory education did not witness its origins during the Enlightenment, but 
instread built on the educational expansion began during the Reformation. School 
systems were instituted on a limited scale for children of the nobility or wealthy 
landowners well before the 18
th
 century. Mostly, educational policy in both Catholic and 
Protestant areas consisted of vernacular religious schools for the common learner and 
more rigorous and lengthy Latin grammar schools for members of the nobility or those 
entering civil service. For the common man, little education was needed; John Locke 
advocated that “The knowledge of the Bible and the business of his own calling is 
enough for the ordinary man; a Gentleman ought to go further.”9 Lay-education 
preceding the Enlightenment served a very limited and basic function, and was deeply 
religious in its foundation, administration, and perceived purpose. 
The emergence of sense-realism, a linear descendent of humanist thought from 
the late Renaissance and early Reformation, resulted in the first “modern schools” of the 
late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-centuries: the Realschule. The Realschule, or “real 
schools” were founded largely in Germany under the reforming efforts of Halle-Pietism
                                                          
9
 Ellwood P. Cubberly, The History of Education: Educational Practice and Progress Considered as a 
Phase of the Development and Spread of Western Civilization, (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 
1920): 435. 
11 
 
under the work of Augustus Hermann Francke.
10
 These schools administered a wide and 
practical variety of subjects, such as history, geography, reading, writing, science, 
language, among a large number of other curricula. More classicist schools were formed, 
known as the gymnasia, incorporating pieces of Realschule reform in addition to a 
regimen of Greek language and culture.
11
 With the growing access to education, it began 
to be included on the list of those rights that belonged to “every man”, cited by Pierre-
Samuel du Pont de Nemours, among others.
12
 
The system of public schooling in Brandenburg-Prussia was established under the 
reforming efforts of Frederick II’s father, Frederick William I (1688-1740). Heavily-
influenced by the Halle-Pietism, he thus instituted reorganization along a limited 
interpretation of the Realschule movement. Frederick William placed great importance 
on overhauling the Prussian administrative class, and reformation in education served to 
bring about a new generation of magistrates and bureaucrats who were more capable in 
their leadership and knowledge-base, and served to consolidate and streamline the daily 
workings of Prussian government.
13
 The need for vast bureaucratic reform to govern the 
disparate and geographically detached states and duchies of Brandenburg-Prussia made 
the promotion of such limited schools a direct benefit to the policies of Frederick William 
I.  
One area Frederick II was lauded by his contemporaries for his Enlightenment 
reforming effort within the state was is expansion and reform of compulsory education. 
                                                          
10
 Cubberly, 468.  
11
 Cubberly, 462. 
12
 Hunt, 125. 
13
 Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600-1947 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006): 246. 
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In 1763, Frederick II instituted the Königlich Preußische Generallandschulreglement, 
establishing compulsory state-controlled schools throughout the Kingdom of Prussia and 
its territories both in and outside the domains of the Holy Roman Empire. The stated 
purpose of the schools was to educate those who did not have the means to do so 
themselves, thereby “preventing harmful and indecent ignorance in order to make a more 
skillful and brighter people from the time the schools can begin educating.”14 Schooling 
was made available to all strata of society from the ages of four to thirteen. Funding 
coming from state programs or local gift from magistrates or parishioners, setting the 
foundation for the continued development of the Prussian general schooling system that 
would be emulated as the model for state schooling.  
The model of Schulpflicht, or compulsory education, as established by the 
Königlich Preußische Generallandschulreglement was incredibly inclusionary for the 
era. Both boys and girls who were no younger than five years of age and had received to 
other form of education would be kept “until the thirteenth year, and will be kept in the 
school until they have achieved not only the basic necessities of Christianity, reading, and 
writing, but also that they can read and answer what should be taught from out prescribed 
and proper textbooks.”15 The Landschule offered a base education encompassing literacy 
and both secular and spiritual themes to the general population, incorporating those who 
had no other alternative to attend, much less pay for, any form of primary educational 
institution.  
                                                          
14
 August Schorn, et al., Geschichte der Pӓdagogik in Vorbildern und Bildern (Leipzeig: Dürrschen 
Buchhandlung, 1906): 204-213. 
15
 Schorn, et al., 204-213. 
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Under Frederick II, compulsory education was extended not only to the Protestant 
majority, but to Catholic inhabitants of Brandenburg-Prussia as well. With the annexation 
of Silesia and the large Catholic population that inhabited it, Frederick II mandated 
compulsory education regardless of denomination in the Königlich Preußische General 
Landschule Reglement für die Romisch-Katholischen.
16
 This idea was furthered with the 
publishing of the codified legal code in Prussia in 1794, which stated that “All public 
schools and educational institutions are under the supervision of the State, and the trials 
and visitations to the same subject at all times. No one should be denied access in public 
schools because of difference of creed.”17 Compulsory education within the Prussian state 
extended to boys and girls, whether Protestant or Catholic. 
Taken at face value, these reforms instituted by the Generallandschulreglement 
and Generallandschulereglement für die Romisch-Katholischen certainly exhibit the 
spirit of the philosopher-prince. These rules served to promote the growing conception of 
individual rights per the intellectual theme of the Enlightenment. However, aside from its 
demographic breadth, the furthering of primary schools within the Prussian state did not 
offer any significant break in purpose or quality from those previous schools established 
under the reforming efforts of Halle-Pietism. The establishment of these schools instead 
served the primary yet unstated function of enlightened absolutism that lay just under the 
legal fiction, that is, to solidify absolute control over all portions of the state under the 
cloak of Enlightenment rhetoric.  
                                                          
16
 Frederick II von Hohenzollern, Königlich Preussische General Landschule Reglement für die Romisch-
Katholischen, (manuscript, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 1765), OPAC Plus. 
17
 Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten, Part II, Title 12 (1796). 
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These schools offered little in terms of expanded curriculum, where the primary 
activity of students remained exercises in reading and writing. Even though the 
intellectual movements within the Enlightenment were largely accomplished on a 
seemingly secular plane and offered a clear divorce from the last remnants of 
scholasticism and Latin-based religious schools, the reality was quite different. Education 
within the compulsory primary schools focused almost exclusively on the reading and 
memorization of scripture. The Enlightenment was very much a movement of the 
intellectual elite. Any sort of dissemination to the masses was seen as utterly futile by the 
grand majority of those shaping intellectual and political trends during the eighteenth-
century. Compulsory schooling was not established within the Kingdom of Prussia to 
offer the Enlightenment to those who were previously denied access, but instead as a 
means to control the population and ease the mild alienation of the traditional aristocracy 
from exclusive control over bureaucratic functions within the emerging notion of the 
state. Through the establishment of schools and the extension of compulsory education to 
all levels of society, both Protestants and Catholics, allowed for the institution of state 
values that greatly solidified state authority over the masses. This affirmed the growing 
conception of statehood and identity into the general population, and helped socialize 
state authority over those that authority extended over, almost as an early model of 
pseudo-nationalism that helped further the growing bureaucracy within the Prussian state. 
Compulsory education and pedagogical reform also took hold in the Electorate of 
Bavaria under Maximilian III Joseph. In 1774, Maximilian III instituted the 
Schulordnung within the Electorate, creating compulsory, state-managed primary schools 
15 
 
for the general population. Students were not only introduced to reading, writing, and 
canon verses, but an array of varying subjects in addition to Latin and a focus on the 
German vernacular.
18
 Schools were funded in a similar manner to those established in 
Prussia under Frederick II, with state-funding being supplemented by church donation 
and personal endowment. 
Though the reform itself was very progressive, its institution was ineffective and 
deeply flawed, seeing little real change in the educational composition of the Electorate. 
The schools mirrored almost consistently those existing in the preceding era, focusing 
almost exclusively on scripture as a means of attempted literacy, yet often falling short in 
even this manner. One traveler through the Electorate following the institution of the 
Schulordnung stated that “in the rural districts there are either no schoolmasters at all or 
miserable wretches that could scarcely read and write and were paid but fifty to one 
hundred florins yearly – poorer pay than was given to day laborers.”19 The schools that 
were established fell drastically short of their intended purpose, riddled with all sorts of 
problems stemming from underfunding to lack of reliable schoolmasters. The 
ineffectiveness of this reform, even despite its seemingly progressive nature, is highlight 
most notably in the drastic call for school reform that emerged under the leadership of 
Montgelas during the modernization of Bavarian social and domestic policy following 
the Napoleonic era. 
                                                          
18
 Maximilian III Joseph von Wittelsbach, Schulordnung, manuscript, (Munich: Bayerische 
Staatsbibltiothek, 1772). 
19
 Chester Penn Higby, The Religious Policy of the Bavarian Government During the Napoleonic Period, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1918): 26. 
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The purpose of these schools mirrored that of educational reform in Prussia. The 
schools established my Maximilian III Joseph largely served to formulate a conception of 
state-identity within the general population and, particularly within Bavaria, reinforcing 
religious norms in the predominantly Catholic Electorate. This was achieved both in the 
curriculum and the establishment of the schools themselves, which served as a visible and 
ever-present arm of state authority that worked towards the perceived benefit of the 
public. The use of scripture as a means of achieving literacy helped affirmed the 
institution of the Catholic Church within the Duchy of Bavaria, an institution that was 
paramount in the historical narrative of Wittelsbach authority.  In addition, compulsory 
education helped undermine to a lesser degree the monopoly the noble class had on 
education and thus the bureaucratic and administrative offices, undermining the power of 
that traditional enemy of monarchical authority.
17 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
LEGAL REFORM AND THE EVOLUTION OF CODIFICATION 
 
 
 One of the most significant implementations of Enlightenment thought can be 
seen in the broad array of legal consolidation and reform undertaken by the enlightened 
absolutist monarchs of the eighteenth century. Enlightenment focus on reason and 
rationality prompted bureaucratic reorganization and legal reform by many European 
rulers, in order to break from the disparate feudal regulations that governed the dynastic 
age and thereby make the state a more efficient and well-regulated entity. Social contract 
theory advocated by John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau popularized a limited 
conception of human liberty in subordination to the compacted state and the general will, 
or volonté générale, of the community as a whole.
20
 Enlightened absolutism molded from 
previous dynastic theories to fit the spirit of its time in that the ruler, if professing to be 
enlightened, had a duty of upholding the general will through his social, political, and 
military policy.  
 Legal consolidation and reform often proved in the best interest of the ruler as 
well as his or her subjects, in that it created a sense of coherence before the law, reduced 
the power and discretion of noble lawyers and judges, streamlining the administrative 
                                                          
20
 Lesaffer, 391. 
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capability of the state. The relationship between these theories is best argued by European 
legal historian Randall Lesaffer:  
rational organization of government and law called for by the Enlightenment 
could only enhance the administrative efficiency of the central government. The 
erosion of the traditional privileges of the estates would subject every citizen 
equally to the prince’s authority. The desire for equality translated itself into a 
policy of national unification of government and law. The Enlightenment 
offered the sovereigns a progressive programme for realising an old dream, that 
of putting an end to the traditional, historic rights and privileges of their most 
powerful subjects.
21
 
 Legal reform instituted along a rights conception of “equality” served as a useful tool to 
solidify absolutist central authority, and was jumped upon by many enlightened 
absolutists of the era in order to capitalize on the opportunity of alienating the power of 
the nobility within the government. The pragmatism of this manner of reform was of 
particular necessity within the political climate of the Germanies, where for too long the 
varying monarchies had proved incapable of dismantling the pervasive influence of the 
nobility in the manner of many Western absolutists, seen most clearly in the example of 
France under Louis XVI in the seventeenth-century. 
 Out of this theme came the early European movements towards codification. 
Stemming from the growing shift towards natural law theory and the principles of 
government, a great desire formulated among many European reformers to replace 
existing law with new statutory compilations based on Enlightenment theory and 
rationalism. Feudal law and Roman law proved incapable of managing the needs of the 
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expanding nation-state, and left a broad measure of discretion to local judges and 
magistrates, often resulting in abuse and corruption. Such philosophes as Charles-Louis 
de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu advocated for a clear-cut system of legal rules drawn 
from a single source that was both certain and comprehensible, “grafting itself onto the 
emergent sovereign state, in which it found a natural ally.”22 Throughout the second half 
of the eighteenth-century, many states began to overhaul their legal systems along these 
guidelines, ever mindful of the powerful ability of codification to undermine the 
influence of the nobility within the courts. More often than not, these codes failed to 
promulgate any definition of rights that aligned with the rhetoric of the enlightenment, 
but instead served as a reinforcement of the status quo and a further legitimization of 
enlightened despotism despite its failure to promulgate Enlightenment principles. 
 Codification in Enlightenment Germany reached a high point under Frederick II, 
as the Prussian legal code promulgated served as a model for many other smaller states 
within the loosely-confederated Empire. Previous attempts at codification were instituted 
by Frederick’s father Frederick William I, aided by legal theorist Christian Thomasius of 
the University at Halle. Codification attempts were drafted in 1714 and 1738 along both 
natural law and Roman law principles, but these attempts proved fruitless in their 
endeavor to create a clear and concise legal code within Prussian holdings.
23
 Frederick II 
took up the mantle of legal reform in conjunction with Justice Minister Samuel von 
Cocceji, attempting to formulate what was known as the Corpus Juris Fredericicanum 
between 1749 and 1751, but was recalled due to a perceived lack of utility, in addition to 
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the growing preoccupation with the political maneuvering and escalation leading up the 
Seven Years’ War.24 
 Frederick fully realized the necessity of comprehensive legal reform in solidifying 
absolutist authority over the state, and after years of work in concurrence with Prussian 
legal theorists Johann Heinrich von Carmer and Carl Gottlieb Suarez, the Allgemeines 
Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (1794) encompassed public law, criminal law, 
commercial law, ecclesiastical law and elements of feudal law.
25
 Though it was published 
after his death, Schulze considers the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten, 
or ALR, as the culmination of Frederick II’s efforts at reforming the legal system of 
Prussia, and can be “regarded as the characteristic expression of his entire government 
and legal opinion,” and therefore can be used as an accurate measure of both his thoughts 
and his efforts regarding humanity’s relation to the law.26  
 The ALR applied enlightenment themes of natural law and natural jurisprudence, 
even delineating the foundation of rights within the Prussian state, maintaining that “the 
general rights of men are founded in their natural liberty to pursue their own interest 
without, however, any encroachment upon the rights of other men.”27 This conception of 
rights was exhibited within the legal code as a characteristic of individual, defining the 
concept of personhood as one who enjoys “certain rights within civil society.”28 
However, many of Frederick II’s reforming goals fell short of the Enlightenment 
idealism and natural law rhetoric that rights theory was built on during the eighteenth-
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century. Most notable is seen in the class structuring of society, which was instituted and 
justified legally under the ALR. Most evident of these failings were the subjective manner 
in which rights were possessed by various class stations within the Kingdom of Prussia. 
The ALR explicitly states this to avoid any confusion or appearance that rights are 
possessed equally and unilaterally among the Prussian citizenry, stating that “Men’s 
rights are determined by their birth, class, actions and events to which the legislation has 
attached certain effects.”29 This solidified rights not as universal or inherent, but as 
subjective to varying criteria, most notably birth and class. Egalitarianism was not 
something that was compatible with the legal fiction of enlightened absolutism, and many 
of the prominent philosophes of the era were staunchly against the concept of 
egalitarianism as an effective model for governance.  
The ALR solidified the status of the peasantry within the Kingdom of Prussia, 
simply codifying those practices of holding the lowest class within its station. Under Part 
II, Title Seven, the rights of the peasantry were laid out in such a manner that tied them to 
their land and station. Under statutes §3 and §4, members of the peasantry were barred 
from pursuing any sort of business, commercial of civic venture that would reduce their 
efficiency in the much-needed agricultural sector, with very limited exceptions permitted 
under expanded portions of Title Seven.
30
 However, the ALR affirmed that even these 
exceptions did not change the bonded status of the peasantry, stating that “by permission 
to participate in a civic sector, the farmer has not changed his standing and personal 
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relationships.”31 Peasants were also drafted into work-groups to expand the infrastructure 
of the state, being “particularly committed to the state manual and team services.”32 
 These laws served the explicit purpose of regulating agricultural production, 
necessary within the Prussian state to feed an army that made up almost one-third of the 
state. No sacrifice could be made in the name of Enlightenment that threatened the 
derivation of Prussian state authority. This trend is affirmed throughout the ALR, stating 
that the cultivation of land is the primary purpose of the Prussian peasantry, and that 
those who show negligence in this task can either be coerced by the state or even have 
their property seized and passed on to another.
33
 In cases of extreme necessity, most 
notably when food stores were needed to fuel the Prussian war machine in times of crisis, 
peasants surpluses could be seized without compensation.
34
 Essentially, the rights of the 
peasantry existed exactly as they did before the institution of the ALR, which only served 
to solidify their unfortunate status within the Prussian hierarchy. While offering progress 
in regards to humanitarian reform and legal predictability, the law itself was subjective in 
regards to class and the influence it had on personhood, thereby offering both a break 
from and a reinforcement of the status quo in Europe at the time.  
Overall the legal reform under Maximilian III Joseph in Bavaria proved to have a 
similar effect to that of Frederick II in Prussia, in that it did not offer a substantial break 
from existing social structure during the eighteenth- century. Maximilian III did 
experience much greater success in instituting comprehensive legal reform and 
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codification within Bavaria, pushing through a successful and coherent legal code in 
1756 with the aid of legal theorist Wigulӓus von Kreittmayr. This codified system of law, 
known as the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis, was much more fluid and 
comprehensible than that of the ALR, deferring to Roman law in absence of statutory 
guidelines per the new code.
35
 It offered a grant of rights in a similar utilitarian 
perspective, citing the source of law not from divine mandate but instead originating from 
the “common good.”36 The legal compendium offered reliability within the courts and an 
expectation in the rule of law, and was also intended to be made accessible to the public. 
The Codex was written and promulgated in Bavarian as opposed to the more formal 
Latin, an attempt to fulfill its mission of accessibility, though literacy obviously served as 
a requirement. This intention was explicitly state under Part I, Chapter 1, §6, that “the 
law must be made publicly known so that all may have the right to know and learn it.”37 
The Codex appeared to derive its legitimacy from popular Enlightenment thought, 
particularly that of social compact theory and natural law theory. The legal compendium 
even offered a definition of natural law and its relation to the state and its citizens: 
The natural law, or Juris Naturae, is law which is founded by God in human 
nature, and allows humanity to recognize the ultimate purpose and inward nature 
that man may only understand through reason: firstly duty to God, then oneself, 
and finally a common desire to meet the needs and conveniences of his fellow-
men.
38
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What the Codex set forth was essentially a restatement of natural law that was inherent to 
humanity, yet derived from God and thus ingrained in human nature thorough creation 
and encompassing universal moral principles. This stood in clear contrast to what the 
Codex set forth as human law, or Juris Humanum. This was defined as a separate branch 
of law that was not inherent to the human condition, instead coming from solely from 
“that which is prescribed indiscriminately by human legislators.”39 The Codex also stated 
that the state formed not from any divine origin, but instead through “nature and human 
arrangement,” thereby appealing to social compact theory as a basis for its legimitimacy 
in the administration of the law.
40
 The peasant class was said to be broken from the 
tradition of Roman law; they were required to give “certain offerings and services, yet 
retains, as any man, his liberty.”41  
However, the Codex seemingly used these legitimizing theories of social compact 
theory and natural law in name only, affixing the new legal compendium with a veritable 
Enlightenment “stamp of approval” only to affirm the existing social and religious 
structure within the Electorate of Bavaria. In almost identical fashion to the ALR in the 
Kingdom of Prussia, the Codex did little more to further the Enlightenment than codify 
and solidify the existing status quo at the time its promulgation. Class differentiation was 
affirmed within the Bavarian legal code, in addition to conceptions of male-domination 
of the family unit and the nobility.
42
 Those who were born serfs enjoyed a differing 
definition of rights, and were completely bound within their station under the legal 
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environment of the Codex. 
43
Affirmation of this social structure was given through 
religious arguments and the upholding of tradition, all of which affirmed the presence of 
a different class with different rights.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN REFORM WITHIN THE NEW LEGAL STRUCTURES 
 
 
With the push towards codification and legal predictability during the Age of 
Enlightenment, there was also a growing current among the philosophes that called for a 
reexamination of criminal law, especially the institution of torture. Very likely a direct 
result of the shifting notion of the self as argued predominantly by Hunt, the move 
towards humanitarian legal reform solidified itself within the courts of Europe and 
became a topic of popular discourse for the era. While not the first to discuss the need for 
penal reform that aligned more closely with the idea of rights and Enlightenment virtue, 
the most notable voice for this reform came from the Milanese Marquis Cesare Beccaria. 
Humanitarian legal reform was the hallmark of Beccaria’s 1764 On Crimes and 
Punishments, serving as a capstone to the growing recognition of human rights within the 
context of the eighteenth-century. Beccaria begins by laying out the well-established 
arguments for social compact theory as the origin of society and the legitimizing 
substance of existing government. In social compact theory, the acceptance of entry in a 
society means the acceptance of a government and its right to punish those who deviate 
from social norms. However, Beccaria warns against the oft-abused nature of 
punishment, quoting Montesquieu in that “Every punishment, which does not arise out of 
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absolute necessity, is tyrannical.”44 Beccaria argued against the objective nature of 
torture, summarizing its flawed logic: 
No man can be judged a criminal until he be proved guilty; nor can society take 
from him the public protection, until it have been proved that he has violated the 
conditions on which it was granted. What right then, but that of power, can 
authorize the punishment of a citizen, so long as there remains any doubt of his 
guilt? If guilty, he should only suffer the punishment ordained by the laws, and 
torture becomes useless, as his confession in unnecessary. If he be not guilty, 
you torture the innocent: for in the eye of the law, every man is innocent, whose 
crime has not been proved. Besides, it is confounding all relations that a man 
should both be both the accuser and accused; and that pain should be the test of 
truth, as if truth resided in the muscles and fibers of a wretch in torture.
45
 
Beccaria laid of an expansive definition of the rights of the accused, relying on logic as 
opposed to traditional practice to outline the flawed nature that served as the foundation 
of the practice of torture.  
In Voltaire’s forward to Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments (1764), he 
authors a heavy criticism of the nature of the prison system in Europe, penning the 
following:  
Surely, the groans of the weak, sacrificed to the cruel ignorance, and indolence 
of the powerful; the barbarous torments lavished, and multiplied with useless 
severity, for crimes wither not proved, or in their nature impossible; the filth and 
horrors of a prison, increased by the most cruel tormentor of the miserable, 
uncertainty, ought to have roused the attention of those whose business is to 
direct the opinions of mankind.
46
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Various acknowledgements of this trend took shape within the codes set forth by both 
Frederick II and Maximilian III Joseph, each shaped to the degree that could both 
accommodate the legal fiction of enlightened absolutism while also meeting the very 
specific yet very different needs of the Electorates of Prussia and Bavaria. 
Frederick II abolished this practice upon his ascension to the throne in 1740, well 
before Beccaria’s famous work, citing its unsound reasoning and stating that, “I hope I 
need make no apology for condemning the use of torture, for preferring to take the part of 
humanity against a practice so shameful to Christians, and to all civilized nations; and, if 
I may venture to add, a practice as useless as cruel.”47 The process of codification under 
the ALR solidified this humanitarian reform, as torture was not introduced as a judicial 
measure under the criminal code provided. 
However, this served to further solidify the legal fiction of absolutism, and served 
to highlight the perceive lack of utility of judicial torture in a state that was financially 
viable, with a streamlined bureaucracy and court system that upheld the law within the 
militaristic society. The financial and domestic success of his predecessors were seen on 
a societal level, with criminals being forced into conscription and pushing forth the 
military arm of the state, and thereby furthering state interests. 
In contrast, the legal reforms laid out by Maximilian III Joseph offered a break 
from the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten in one significant theme, in 
that judicial torture was upheld in Bavaria as a means of interrogation, punishment for 
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crime, and deterrent for future criminals.
48
 Maximilian III issued his proclamation 
regarding torture just seven years after Frederick II’s abolition of the same, upholding 
judicial torture due to a continues perception of its benefits in regards to the established 
legal system, and preferring any change in this practice to come at the distraction of the 
lower court officials. 
Torture served as direct reflection of the nature of crime within the Electorate, 
catering directly to the needs of the Bavarian state. Compared to the financial viability of 
the Prussian state due to its military success and bureaucratic reform, Bavaria existed 
within a state of financial panic and stress for the entirety of the reign of Maximilian III 
Joseph. Huge indemnities were placed on the Bavarian Elector by Habsburg Austria 
following Bavaria’s capitulation in the War of Austrian Succession, a direct result of Karl 
Albrecht’s foreign policy and brief stint as Emperor in violation of the Pragmatic 
Sanction, a feat made possible with French funding and through Prussian military 
prowess and political backing.
49
 With this financial ruin, poverty and famine rose in a 
drastic manner within the Electorate, resulting in a sharp rise in crime. Baron Johann 
Kaspar Riesbeck in his Travels Through Germany noted this point, citing the desperate 
situation in Bavaria, where Austrian troops had “plundered the archives, robbed the 
nobility, laid waste to the country, and carried the peasants into captivity.”50 Even barring 
the ramifications of Austrian occupation, Bavaria had little to offer in terms of a vibrant 
economy to promote stability. Bavaria during the mid-eighteenth-century held an annual 
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revenue of 7,500 German florins and fielded an army of 30,000 men, compared to 
Prussian and Austrian incomes of 35,000 and 200,000 German florins, respectively, and 
both fielding armies of 180,000.
51
 Riesbeck notes the effect of this financial strain on the 
population, stating that there was “little vestige of industry in either town or country, with 
brewers, bakers, and innkeepers being the only rich tradesmen.”52 In short, Bavaria 
during the reign of Maximilian III Joseph was exhibiting a period of financial ruin, a ruin 
that had wide effect on the population and thus on the levels of crime within the 
Electorate. 
This widespread rise in crime due to poverty was seen in the vast amount of 
beggars and vagrants who, with no other economic outlet to prevent starvation, resorted 
to crime. Signs depicting various scenes of torture under the law were erected on the 
borders of all local districts, or Pfleggerichte, within the Electorate to serve as a deterrent 
for the vast amount of fluid population.
53
 In a state that was emerging from the ruin of 
Austrian occupation and a disastrous set of wars, any seemingly effective means to 
control time and assert state authority couldn’t be sacrificed to uphold Enlightenment 
idealism. This use of judicial torture to deter crime and stop the spread of vagrancy 
within the state is highlighted under the Codex Juris Bavaricus Criminalis, exhibiting 
punishments ranging from hanging to breaking upon the wheel.
54
 However, those court 
officials deemed to have applied torture in excess or for lesser offenses were subject to 
judicial action, and the manner in which torture was applied was very prescriptive and 
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restrained for crimes that posed a direct threat to state stability, particularly within the 
realm of treason, vagrancy, and religious subversion.
55
 While humanitarian reform was 
not exhibited in the degree that was capable with the social realities experienced by 
Prussia during the Enlightenment, there is still a traceable degree of influence. This 
demonstrated the clear and direct nature of pragmatism in the application of 
Enlightenment thinking to judicial reform; in short, reform could only extend so far in 
alignment with the realities of the state.
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION WITHIN PRUSSIA AND BAVARIA 
 
 
One of the most prominent shifts in political culture following the Peace of 
Westphalia was the manner in which state confessional identity transitioned from the 
forefront of European power-politics to a less prevalent social sphere. The fracture of the 
Protestant and Calvinist faiths from the Catholic Church served as the impetus for wide-
scale political and social upheaval during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
culminating in the Thirty Years War in 1618. This prolonged period of warfare 
effectively broke the centralizing efforts of the Holy Roman Emperor, but saw mass de-
population and famine wrought among the varying German states due to the lack of troop 
discipline, in addition to the methods of self-finance and bellum se ipsum alet logistics 
that sustained the armies of the era. With the growing reliance on reason as opposed to 
dogma as the impetus for action in the Enlightenment era, religion ceased to operate as a 
legitimate and well-recognized cassus belli among the great powers of Europe. Religious 
identity still served as an important facet of state identity, influencing the manner in 
which European powers conducted domestic affairs and related with other states.  
The interrelationship between religion and the emerging conception of the state 
was the focus of popular discussion among a great number of the philosophes. In stark 
contrast to the exclusionary religious policies of the preceding century, many 
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Enlightenment theorists offered up the concept of religious toleration on the state 
level. This theory of toleration emerged in force beginning in 1689, with the publication 
of A Letter Concerning Toleration, authored by John Locke. Locke argued that toleration, 
above all things, should be the most natural discourse flowing from the Christian faith. 
Locke argued that “the toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion, is 
so agreeable to the gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind; that it 
seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of 
it in a clear light.
56
 Toleration, according to Locke, was grounded not only in scripture, 
but in reason. Locke goes on to argue that civil government exists for the sole purpose of 
promoting the external welfare, and is incompatible in promoting the internal nature that 
lies within the realm of religion; therefore, there must be a separation between the state 
and the church. Locke reasoned that “churches have neither any jurisdiction in worldly 
matters, nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince men’s 
minds of error, and inform them of the truth.”57 In direct contrast to the policies of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Locke argued that the extension of toleration to 
religious dissenters actually served to enhance state stability and cohesion. 
However, there were groups identified by Locke that did not fit into an 
Enlightenment conception of toleration. Those confessions that answer to a corporeal and 
supreme religious head, particularly that of the Roman Catholic Church or the Islamic 
faith, were unable to exist under toleration due to the perceived conflict regarding their 
loyalty to the state. As stated by Locke, “it is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to 
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be a Mahometan only in his religion, but in every thing else a faithful subject to a 
Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield 
blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to the 
Ottoman Empire.”58 Locke identified this string of diluted loyalties as subversive to state 
authority, stating that obedience to the Pope or the Grand Mufti was identical allowing 
subjects to serve another prince, and therefore could not be extended toleration. The 
second group which had no place under Locke’s theory of toleration was those who had 
no belief, as Locke argued that atheists had no moral or ethical grounding, and thus had 
no cause for upholding any sort of oath. Locke states that atheists had no place within the 
framework of state stability, as “promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of 
human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.”59 While religious toleration within the 
state did extend to various sects and denominations of the Christian faith and even to 
Jews, there was still no method of conceptualizing atheists, followers of Islam, or Roman 
Catholics as anything but subversive within the state envisioned by Locke.  
The argument for religious toleration was furthered by another great philosophe in 
Voltaire’s Treatise on Toleration in 1763. Voltaire argued that toleration was a necessity 
on a wide scale, famously quoting:  
It does not require great art or studied elocution, to prove that Christians ought 
to tolerate each other. Nay, I shall go still farther, and say, that we ought to look 
upon all men as our brethren! How! Call a Turk, a Jew, and a Siamese, my 
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brother? Yes, doubtless; for are we all not children of the same parent, and the 
creatures of the same creator?
60
 
What Voltaire argued for in this passage was a call for relating as humans despite cultural 
and ethnic differences, offering a marked break from the stifling social policies that 
characterized the reactionary period following the Reformation, culminating in the Wars 
of Religion that wracked Europe until 1648. This is a clear allusion to the nature of the 
empathetic element and its pervasive effect in changing the manner in which rights were 
viewed in Enlightenment Europe, changing the relationships between individual and 
individual, as well as individual and society and the bodies that governed it. 
 Voltaire saw religion as, at best, a provisional and untested hypothesis, preferring 
instead the ambiguous and less dogmatic doctrines of Deism that many of the 
philosophes subscribed to. In this search for what Voltaire would deem an untestable and 
thus unknowable truth, Voltaire posits the rhetorical question:  
After all, can we be supposed to be intimately acquainted with the ways of God, 
or to fathom the whole depth of his mercy? Is it not sufficient if we are faithful 
sons of the church, without every individual presuming to wrest the power out of 
the hand of God, and to determine, before him, the future destiny of our fellow 
creatures?
61
  
Voltaire sought to promulgate the concept of religious toleration on the state level by 
appealing to Enlightenment skepticism and focus on reason, both of which served to 
strengthen his arguments for the benefit of tolerance in relation to the state. 
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This emerging conception of religious toleration took hold in Prussia under 
Frederick II. Brandenburg-Prussia owed much of the success of its rise to power to both 
religious toleration and inclusion. The importance of religious identity and its 
legitimizing influence over monarchical government was a theme that pervaded European 
states throughout the post-Reformation world. Brandenburg-Prussia was an incredibly 
unique state for the time due to the confessional diversity within its borders, 
encompassing a Lutheran majority and prominent Catholic minority in Brandenburg and 
Pomerania.
62
 This minority was expanded under John Sigismund, being granted the 
predominantly Catholic Ducal Prussia after swearing fealty to the Roman Catholic King 
of Poland in 1618, thereby realizing three prominent religiously diverse populations 
under his rule. To further complicate matters, John Sigismund converted to Calvinism 
under personal conviction in 1613. In this seemingly volatile religious environment, John 
Sigismund opted to pursue a policy of toleration rather than face dissent or resistance 
from Catholic nobles in Ducal Prussia or the Lutheran majority within Brandenburg 
proper, promulgating an edict of toleration in 1615 stating that “His Electoral Highness in 
no way arrogated to himself dominion over consciences and therefore does not wish to 
impose any suspect or unwelcome preachers on anyone, even in places where he enjoys 
the rights of patronage.”63  
This idea of toleration through lack of forced conversion was expanded further 
under the reign of Frederick William, the Great Elector. In 1685, Frederick William 
issued the Edict of Potsdam, allowing admittance into Brandenburg-Prussia those French 
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Huguenots who fled in mass exodus from Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 
who were predominantly Calvinist.
64
 As stated within the Edict of Potsdam, Frederick 
William highlighted his duty as a staunch Calvinist and member of the Protestant 
community to offer a safe-haven to those suffering from persecution, stating that “We 
now, out of the righteous sympathy which We must in justice feel toward these, Our co-
religionists, who are oppressed and assailed for the sake of the Holy Gospel and its pure 
doctrine, have been moved graciously to offer them through this Edict signed by Our own 
hand a secure and free refuge in all Our Lands and Provinces, and further to announce to 
them what justice, liberties and prerogatives We are most graciously minded to concede 
to them.”65  
Frederick William expanded on this policy by later accepting nonconformist 
Protestants from the Kingdom of Poland who were being persecuted and marginalized 
under the predominantly Catholic population. In addition to the mainstream Christian 
sects, Frederick William also extended domicile and toleration in practice to many Jewish 
families, who throughout Europe were the target of ridicule and persecution on the state 
and local scale. In stark contrast to many other states within the German territories of the 
Holy Roman Empire and Europe as a whole, Frederick William’s personal and political 
convictions were absent of the prevalent anti-Semitism of the time. Frederick William 
encouraged to creation of small Jewish communities of the outlying duchies of Kleve and 
Mark, and even encouraged the settlement of over fifty wealthy Jewish families within 
Brandenburg proper following the expulsion of all Jewish residents from Austria under 
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the reign of the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold in 1671.
66
 While the extension of 
religious toleration did offer a clear break from the more common policy of persecution 
and expulsion that was practiced on a pan-European scale, those individuals who were 
extended domicile under the law within Brandenburg-Prussia were more often than not 
the most wealthy and influential members of that particular group, alluding to toleration 
as more of a pragmatic policy than flowing from some idealistic egalitarian or 
humanitarian principle.  
Frederick II was very much a product of certain circles of Enlightenment popular 
culture in regards to his conception of religion, and many Enlightenment historians have 
accepted Frederick II as a follower of deism. Deism offered a middle-ground between the 
traditional dogmatic principles of the era of the Reformation and the increasing atheistic 
skepticism of some of the more radical Enlightenment thinkers, and became the popular 
course of belief for such Enlightenment greats as John Locke, Voltaire, Montesquieu, 
and, to a lesser degree, Immanuel Kant.  Frederick frequently spoke of religion in his 
private correspondence with a scathing cynicism, citing religion as enemy of progress 
and as the cause of much grief within the history of man. In a letter to Voltaire dated 
September 9
th
, 1736, Frederick II offers up his opinion of organized religions of all kinds, 
stating that “with respect to theologians, it appears that they generally resemble each 
other, be they of what nation or of what religion they may. Their design is to arrogate to 
themselves a despotic power over the conscience, and this is sufficient to render them the 
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zealous persecutors of all those who nobly dare to unveil truth.”67 This cynicism towards 
both the Catholic and Protestant religions was exceedingly evident and deeply-pervasive 
in his writings to Voltaire. Frederick II speaks with cynicism of the indebtedness of those 
Protestant princes to “Luther and Calvin (poor creatures in other respects) who have freed 
them from the yoke of priests, and have very considerably increased their revenues, by 
the secularization of ecclesiastical estates. Their religion however is not purified from 
superstition and bigotry.”68  
This shows the very derisive nature in which Frederick viewed religion within his 
personal life, but this did not manifest itself in an open manner within the state, as 
religion itself was ingrained within both Prussian and European culture in an inseparable 
way. Frederick II highlights this necessity in maintaining some visible confessional 
identity, writing to Voltaire that “a man who has the character of being destitute of 
religion, though he be the most worthy man on earth, is generally decried. Religion is the 
idol of the people, and whoever dares to touch it with hand profane, draws down their 
hatred, and is held in abomination by them.”69 While Frederick II may have been a 
skeptic of religion and its influences, he was far from denouncing it on a state level. 
Frederick II’s conception of religion can be seen to have an influence on his 
policy regarding confessional differences and their relation to the state, as seen through 
the programmes he enacted in favor of religious toleration. When examining the status of 
religion under the Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten, Frederick II and 
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the Prussian jurists who compiled the statutory code offer what appears to be a very 
progressive legal definition in favor of religious toleration within the state. The majority 
of these statutes are grounded in Volume II, Title 11 of the ALR, under the section “Of 
the rights and obligations of churches and religious societies.” The first statute under this 
title states that within the Prussian state, “The population of the state, in terms of God and 
divine things, faith, and internal worship, cannot be the subject of coercive laws.”70 This 
degree of non-interference offered a substantial break from existing norms regarding 
varying religious policies under absolutism, and found its source directly from 
Enlightenment discourse. These efforts were further affirmed within the Prussian legal 
code, stating under §3 of Title 11 that “No man is guilty to adopt his private matters of 
religion by state regulation.”71 Under the ALR, subjects of the Prussian state were 
therefore free from forced-conversion or state-administered religion. 
Religious toleration was not only set in the negative sense of being “free from 
coercion,” but also in a more positive right-granting sense, in that subjects were actually 
gifted the liberty of choice. This was codified under the ALR, stating under §2 of Title 11 
that “each population in the state must be allowed a perfect liberty of religion and 
conscience,” which served as a very clear and inarguable grant of religious tolerance by 
the state.
72
 However, this grant was not without exceptions that conflict with a 21
st
 
century conception of rights, and therefore one must be cognizant of the differences 
maintained between religious freedom and religious toleration. Citizens, when deemed 
necessary by the state, still were forced to identify themselves along confessional lines. 
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The ALR indicated under Title 11 §5 that “the State may require of a single subject a 
statement to which religious party the same may confess, only if the force and validity of 
certain civil actions depends on it.”73 If the confessional identity of the subject was a 
threat to stability or order within the Prussian state, then this could serve as grounds for 
persecution on the individual level, as stated under Part 11 §6. While this did serve to 
identify and ostracize certain beliefs as unsavory to the state, it did so on the individual 
level with legal standing that did not apply to the religious group as a whole, and thus 
served as a mild barrier against persecution of the entire confessional party. Religious 
toleration therefore existed as a private right and free from forced conversion, but was by 
no means an extensive freedom granted to the Prussian citizenry, and therefore offered no 
substantive or progressive reform from the necessary emphasis on religious toleration 
carried forth throughout Prussian domestic policy during the seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-centuries. 
However, the origins of religious reform within the Prussian state were extended 
in a very pragmatic nature that met the realities of the religious composition of the state, 
as opposed to any real consideration of the growing Enlightenment conception of 
individual or community rights. As stated previously, the territories comprising the 
Kingdom of Prussia administered by Frederick II consisted of a wide array of strong 
religious minorities, often separated from Brandenburg proper by multiple German states 
and principalities, such as that of East Prussia, the duchies of Mark and Kleve, and 
conquered Silesia. The threat this posed to Prussian eminence within the Holy Roman 
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Empire is not only revealed in their domestic policy, but the in the consistent efforts by 
the Electors in Berlin to consolidate and link up these disparate territories through the 
acquisition of areas such as West Prussia and Hannover-Braunschweig. These policies 
can be clearly traced by examining the expansion of the Prussian state throughout the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, as these many of these long-desired territories are 
absorbed in the ever-growing Prussian state that came to dominate late-nineteenth 
century German politics, eventually leading to the proclamation of the German Empire. 
Because territorial consolidation through rapid conquest was not a viable option 
following the wresting of Silesia from Austria under Frederick II, religious toleration 
served as a pragmatic and essential means of solidifying state authority over more distant 
territories. 
The status of religious toleration within the Electorate of Bavaria took on a very 
different face, yet one no less catered to meet the needs of the social and religious 
realities of the Electorate.  While excess within the Catholic religion was curtailed by the 
efforts of Maximilian III Joseph, the Bavarian legal code still affirmed a heavy amount of 
punitive measures against blasphemy, heresy, witchcraft, and conversion. However, the 
focus of these laws did not target individuals directly for varying faith, and in fact 
protected a great number of minority Protestant and Calvinist communities within the 
Electorate. The goal of the Bavarian religious policy sought instead to curtail conversion 
of the Catholic majority through punitive manners.  
Legal penalties are cited within the Codex Juris Bavaricus Criminalis for those 
that contradicted and challenged religious orthodoxy within the Catholic Electorate. 
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Under Part I, Chapter VII of the Codex Juris Bavaricus Criminalis, a wide array of 
religious crimes are cited, in addition to their respective punishments. The first statute 
under Chapter VII prohibited blasphemy against the Catholic creed, stating the following: 
“Blasphemy, speaking insultingly of God himself, his divine attributes or his 
saints, particularly of the Virgin Mary or of the Catholic Creed, its articles and 
mysteries, the holy scriptures, divine worship, or of other things in the divine 
plan, incurs a penalty of arbitrary fine, imprisonment, public disgrace or heavier 
punishment for the first offence; banishment and beating with rods for the 
second offence; and death by the sword for the third offence.”74  
Those who knowingly spread religious opinions contrary to the church, excluding 
protected communities of Protestants and Jews, were subject to fines and even death 
under the Bavarian legal code. Under Chapter VII, §5, those who were cited as obvious 
and consistent heretics and continued to uphold their unorthodox beliefs in spite of 
church instruction were “to banished from the country forever, or imprisoned, and to be 
kept up with little food until they recognize their mistakes, recant, and have been 
revoked.”75 
Those who blasphemed through physical action such as desecrating or stealing 
church property or articles related to the Catholic sacrament faced harsh punitive 
measures. Under Chapter II of the Codex Juris Bavaricus Criminalis, §17 states that 
church thieves accused of taking “monstrance or ciborien, in which the Holy Communion 
                                                          
74
 Codex Juris Bavaricus Criminalis, Part I, Chapter 7, §1.  
75
 Codex Juris Bavaricus Criminalis, Part I, Chapter 7, §5. 
44 
 
wafers are also stolen, or dishonored, are punished with burning.”76 This punitive 
approach to disrespect to church property or articles was prevalent within Maximilian III 
Joseph’s legal reforms. Under Chapter VII, §2 of the Codex, those who spat on, threw, or 
desecrated any effigy of Christ, the Saints, or any Holy image were subject to death by 
the sword.
77
 Punishment was even more severe for those who desecrated the Host, or 
alter bread, which incurred a penalty of live-burning at the stake.
78
 Under the Bavarian 
legal code, the sanctity of Catholic imagery and the Sacraments were the subject of 
severe judicial protection. This reinforced the stabilizing and unifying power that the 
church had in Bavaria under the Wittelsbachs.  
Punishment was severe for those who broke away from the Catholic faith, as 
conversion was seen as a serious threat to the power and cohesion of the state. Under §4, 
it is stated that “Apostates or renegades who assume abandonment of the Christian 
Catholic faith to become heathen, Jewish, or Mahometan, without difference as to 
whether they previously held different religion, or not, will be punished with the sword 
and confiscation of goods.”79 This fear of conversion as a subverting influence to state 
authority was affirmed under Chapter VII, §5 of the Codex. In addition to punishing those 
who failed to recant heresy as stated above, those who actively sought to spread their 
unorthodox beliefs were subject to punishment much stricter than banishment, 
imprisonment, or fines. Under §5, “if the heretical teachings are spread with diligence, 
others are seduced by, or perhaps even incited against the authorities; so should heretics 
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or agitators reported be executed with the sword, and the dead corpse be burned at the 
stake.”80 This shows the clear theme within the Bavarian legal compendium that the issue 
lay not within heretical belief itself, but the spreading of heresy. This points to the social 
and religious realities of the Bavarian state during the reign of Maximilian III: in a state 
comprised almost exclusively of Catholic subjects and in which much of the legitimizing 
forces came from confessional identity, large-scale movements away from the Catholic 
faith were a legitimate de-stabilizing force that could not be afforded in order to maintain 
state authority.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 
CONCLUSION: HISTORY, MEMORY AND THE DELICATE TRADITION OF 
RIGHTS REFORM 
 
 
 The institution of enlightened absolutism that emerged in the eighteenth-century 
served as a unique platform from which reform can be viewed. This strange paradox of 
absolute authority under the will of the monarch, the hallmark of dynastic absolutism, 
coupled with the focus on reason and skepticism, the hallmark of the Enlightenment, 
served as an ideal legal fiction to solidify state authority over the subversive influences of 
the past centuries. Top-down reform was able to take hold within the Kingdom of Prussia 
and the Duchy of Bavaria that resulted in a variety of outcomes that fell along a wide 
spectrum: an increase in literacy and school accessibility at the cost of deep inculcation of 
state idealism and homogenization; the institution of broad and comprehensive legal 
reform that allowed for consistency when approaching the courts, yet solidified control 
state control over the nobility and affirmed class and patriarchal constructs that were oft 
the target of Enlightenment criticism on the eve of the American and French Revolutions; 
the institution of humanitarian legal reform that reduced the pervasiveness of torture, but 
on a limited scale and only when no real barrier existed to prevent its enactment; and 
lastly, the introduction of religious toleration in religiously plural areas, but still 
reinforced the norms of the confessional majority in areas that enjoyed a heavy degree of 
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unity. The nature of examining rights reform during the Aufklärung poses some very 
difficult questions. The first idea that must be wrestled with is the relationship between 
history and memory that characterizes the German historical tradition in a manner that is 
often overlooked. Objective history is an ideal that can never be obtained, as the eyes of 
the viewer are unable to free themselves from the epistemic qualities that bind them to 
their place and time, and neither German nor Enlightenment history can escape this truth. 
Historian Wolfgang J. Mommsen states this reality most eloquently: 
We can no longer regard history as a sphere of reality in which we perceive the 
rippling of "God's cloak" in the winds of time. We can no longer see it as a 
continuum of historical developments whose inherent meaning - define that 
meaning as we will - we can decipher if we will only study historical events 
closely enough.
81
 
The difficulty of examining the nature of reform in both Prussia and Bavaria comes from 
delicate nature of the German historical tradition and the historical narrative of rights 
reform as well, both of which fall prey this conception of a historical continuum. 
 There exists a strong amount of scholarship that offers a teleological view of 
history that traces the rise of Prussia in a manner that begs for unification under this wise 
and powerful defender of the German peoples. When examining the various reforms and 
political maneuvers taken by the Great Elector in the wake of the Thirty Years War to the 
establishment of a strong military and efficient bureaucracy under Frederick William I, it 
is often to a fault that their political failings and the limited nature of their reforming 
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efforts fall the wayside in favor of an argument that sets up Prussia on its course towards 
unification in 1871.  
This pervasiveness of the Borussian historical tradition has a sweeping effect on 
the way the history of the German Enlightenment is viewed, and the theories put forth 
about the nature of such reform offer a counter against this. Prussia under Frederick II, 
ever the darling of the Enlightenment, is oft cited as possessing a deep and influential 
commitment to Enlightenment principles that spurred the developing state on its path 
towards unification, and just reward for its just policies. This historical trend completely 
ignores the nature of the reign of Frederick II, with such glaring contradictions as his 
expansionist foreign policy and use of bullying and rhetorical language to alienate 
Catholic Austria while garnering favor among the lower German princes.
82
 This trend can 
also be highlighted in the manner in which Prussia, always the critic of the petty 
“mercenary-princes” of Hesse-Kassel, Württemberg, and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 
among others, had a strong history of subsidy agreements to augment state funds that 
helped propel its rise as a regional power.
83
 History, like many of the great reformers and 
reactionaries of the era, has mastered the use of language to change the character of 
events and policy throughout the Enlightenment. 
However, what this research demonstrates most clearly is that Frederick II, above 
all, instituted reform to a degree that it matched both his needs on a domestic scale and 
his grand designs abroad. While it not my goal, and would be a very dangerous one 
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indeed, to attempt to dispel or assign a value to both Frederick II and Maximilian III 
Joseph’s commitment to Enlightenment ideals, what can be certain is that these 
commitments matched perfectly with the very specific and, as demonstrated, very unique 
needs between the Kingdom of Prussia and the Duchy of Bavaria. This fact obliterates 
the notion of the Borussian historical tradition in that it helps bring out the reality of 
reform within Prussia: reform could only go so far as it suited the needs placed upon state 
authority, most certainly in a time where Prussian ascendance into the role of a European 
great power was yet unsolidified. It is because of this fact that one must use great caution 
when assigning differing value to the nature of reform in both Prussia and Bavaria. 
In a similar theme, yet infinitely more difficult to wrestle with, is the true 
domestic and historical significance of the reforms put forth by both Frederick II and 
Maximilian III Joseph. What we know is that both the Allgemeines Landrecht für die 
Preußischen Staaten and the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis were both short 
lived in their original form; the ALR was rolled back in the wake of the Stein-Hardenberg 
Reforms in 1806, and the CMBC was upheld yet remodeled with the reforms instituted 
under Montgelas. The incomplete nature of the reforms taken by Frederick II and 
Maximilian III Joseph is most evident in their failure to survive the radical Enlightenment 
that erupted with the French Revolution. Bavaria took an active role in supporting French 
forces during the Napoleonic era, while Prussia was forced to integrate a more pervasive 
definition of Enlightenment reform in order to cope with the realities that came with 
capitulation to France under Napoleon’s forces, as reforms along the French model were 
pressed upon the Germanies in a direct measure with the reorganization that came with 
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the Confederation of the Rhine.
84
 The reforms instituted modeled those taken under the 
Revolution ideology, yet dealt with the same general social spheres: compulsory 
education, codified legal reform, humanitarian penal principles and expansive religious 
toleration. Ultimately, the established reform that simply restated and reinforced existing 
social structures within the two stated was unable to maintain its conservative character 
in the face of French power and the liberalism that fueled its ideology. 
What is most important to note is the essential nature of language within the realm 
of Enlightenment and rights reform. The language appealed to was both popular and 
progressive at the time, and the reforms set forth by both Frederick II and Maximilian III 
Joseph heavily appealed to it. Such phrases as the common good, natural law, 
personhood, and human rights pervaded both legal codes and served as a deep 
legitimizing influence for both their institution and their effectiveness in solidifying state 
control. But once the language is scraped away, it can be shown that the offered little in 
the terms of deep reform, even when removing any expectation of the egalitarianism that 
was so feared by the philosophes of the era. However, the history of rights reform still 
falls victim to the same fallacy as other branches when examined through the eye of the 
twenty first-century. The history of human rights cannot be viewed as a constant and 
consistent upward march, but rather as a difficult and tedious process of reform and 
reaction, with backsliding the rule rather than the exception. Even then, many of the same 
definitional issues that plagued both the ALR and the CMBC are still in play; namely, the 
use of language in the absence of substantial reform, and reform only the degree that 
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pragmatism allowed, that which was both convenient and practical in solidifying state 
authority.
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